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1 Introduction
Market exchange, while typically value enhancing, also often has the potential to
create significant negative externalities, such as environmental pollution. Tradi-
tional economic policies—for instance, Pigouvian taxes—may fail to correct these
market failures, as when policymakers lack information or are subject to lobbying
(Be´nabou and Tirole 2010). An important question, therefore, deals with the extent
to which market participants exhibit social responsibility and voluntarily internalize
externalities, thus providing an alternative possible remedy to the problem of
negative external costs from market activity.
To address this question, a growing strand of economic research studies pro-
social or ethical behavior in experimental market contexts (e.g., Danz et al. 2012;
Falk and Szech 2013; Bartling et al. 2015; Irlenbusch and Saxler 2015; Kirchler
et al. 2015; Pigors and Rockenbach 2016; Sutter et al. 2016). While much of this
research is recent, the use of laboratory experiments to study the voluntary
internalization of externalities extends back to Plott (1983), who conducted—to our
knowledge—the first experimental study explicitly focused on behavior in markets
with negative externalities. Plott’s findings are very clear—behavior closely
approximates the predictions of traditional theory that market actors will ignore the
impacts of their actions on others. In contrast, the results of more recent studies
often find market participants to show substantial concern for the external impacts
of their actions. For example, Bartling et al. (2015, henceforth BWY) study a
posted-offer market in which buyers and sellers can trade goods with and without
externalities. The results reveal, across several varying market settings, that a
substantial and fairly stable fraction of market participants exhibit concern for social
impact, by forgoing profits to eliminate negative externalities.
One important feature of BWY’s design—and of many other papers in the recent
literature—is that they study a particular type of externality: each ‘‘harmful’’
product that a consumer purchases yields a large and concentrated negative impact,
i.e., on a single person outside the market. However, the scope of real-world market
impacts—who is affected by an external cost—may vary considerably. Product
externalities may be concentrated, creating significant harm for a small set of
people, or they can be diffused and create relatively small individual impacts for a
large number of individuals. An example of a highly concentrated impact on a
relatively small set of people is the prominent Minamata case in Japan (Harada
1995). The Chisso Corporation, a Japanese chemical company supplying, among
other things, liquid crystal for the production of LCDs, released untreated mercury-
polluted water into an enclosed bay in Minamata over a period of 36 years between
1932 and 1968. This led to thousands of deaths and victims of disease. The
Minamata fishing families, who relied on a locally-sourced seafood-rich diet, bore
the costs of such highly concentrated mercury poisoning. A contrasting example of
a more diffused negative external impact of market activity is the mercury
emissions of the mining industry in Chile, where wastewater is often released into
the rivers (Barrios-Guerra 2004). This results in rapid dilution and flow of much of
the mercury into the ocean. While this potentially exposes a much larger number of
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people living close to coastal waters to pollution than the number of villagers in
Minamata Bay, the harm imposed on each individual is much smaller in magnitude.
While this contrast is stark, there are numerous other examples of where
externalities from similar market activities can create large burdens for small
numbers of people or smaller burdens for many more individuals.1 However, little is
understood about how such variation in the scope of market externalities affects the
extent to which market participants are willing to incur costs to mitigate the harm
they produce.
There are several reasons to believe that the distinction between concentrated and
diffused impacts may be meaningful in eliciting social concern. For instance, a
recent experimental study by Schumacher et al. (2016), using a variety of stylized
distributional games, finds that pro-social concerns appear to exhibit insensitivity to
the number of people affected and, instead, respond mainly to the magnitude of the
cost incurred per capita. Social concern in markets may similarly respond to
whether external costs are diffused—such that a small cost is imposed on several
individuals—or concentrated—such that a much larger impact is imposed on a
single individual, as in BWY. Schumacher et al.’s results suggest that, in the former
case, the total harm imposed might be neglected, despite being substantial in sum,
since subjects solely focus on the magnitude of the per capita harm and largely
ignore the number of affected individuals.
While less closely, our research question also relates to a small literature in
psychology on ‘‘identifiable victims,’’ which indicates that concern for the harm
imposed on others might depend on the degree to which external impacts fall clearly
on a single person or on a less personifiable collective. For example, Small and
Loewenstein (2003), Small et al. (2007) and Slovic (2007) demonstrate that
individuals exhibit greater concern for more ‘‘personalized’’ victims than for
‘‘statistical victims’’ in laboratory and field experiments. Thus, news stories about
workers highly mistreated at a particular factory may have a greater impact on
consumer’s social concern than ones about firms lobbying to limit worker
protections. That is, social concern in markets may similarly respond to whether
comparably-sized impacts are felt by single individuals (‘‘personalized’’) or are
diffused over larger numbers of (‘‘statistical’’) victims.
To address our research question, we employ a version of BWY’s market design
in which we exogenously vary whether a fixed external harm from market activity is
diffused over many people or concentrated on a single person. This provides a clean
test of whether the scope of externalities affects pro-social market behavior. While
the laboratory environment is a highly stylized one in which to study complex
markets, the control it affords allows us to exogenously vary the scope of the
1 For instance, there exist varying forms of pollution (pesticides, radioactive waste, etc.) with differently
sized impacts for different numbers of people, as in our example. As another example, overexploitation of
a specific resource of value to a relatively small group of people living in a circumscribed area (e.g., a
variety of fish relied upon by a local population) has more focused impacts than other similar wider
ranging market activities (overfishing in general). Similarly, a firm entirely disregarding safety
requirements to cut costs may yield unsafe working conditions for employees at a particular factory (e.g.,
the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh that killed 1135 workers in 2013), in contrast to a firm
engaging in lobbying for slightly relaxed labor safety laws and thereby having smaller impacts on
potentially many more individual workers.
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external impact, while keeping the total harm produced by external impacts and
other features of the market environment constant.
In our market setting, subjects in the roles of buyers and sellers can exchange two
types of products that have the same monetary value for buyers but differ in their
social impact and in their production cost. A ‘‘harmful’’ product imposes a negative
externality on subjects in the passive role of third parties. A ‘‘fair’’ product does not
impose an externality, but costs more to produce. As our focus, our treatments vary
the scope of the market externality, while holding constant the overall aggregate
impact. Specifically, we consider two extreme cases in which the full impact of the
externality produced by a market transaction is either borne by a single third party,
as in BWY, or in which the same impact is diffused over all six third parties that are
linked to a market. Our design allows us to address the important question of how
the scope—the number of people affected by an externality and the size of the
impacts—affects market participants’ social concern. It also allows us to test a
possible reason for why the results of Plott (1983), who has highly diffused external
market impacts, finds little social concern, while others, such as BWY, find
substantially more concern for social impact.
To preview our results, we find that the market share of the fair product is slightly
lower when the harm from an externality is diffused over several third parties than
when it is concentrated on a single third party, but this difference is relatively small
and not robustly statistically significant. More precisely, we first replicate the main
finding of BWY, who observed a substantial market share for the fair product when
the externality is imposed on one person (43 percent in the current paper when the
externality is concentrated, compared to 44 percent in BWY).2 Thus, our
experimental markets do not converge to the competitive equilibrium predicted
by traditional theory, in which only the harmful and cheaper-to-produce product is
traded. Importantly, this finding holds even in our treatment with diffused harm,
where the market share of the fair product amounts to 35 percent, and it stabilizes at
levels close to this percentage. That is, even when the externality is diffused over
several subjects, markets do not behave as if externalities were irrelevant. Hence,
we conclude that, while a more diffused impact seems to lower somewhat market
participants’ concerns for negative externalities, it does not eliminate or greatly
diminish such concern.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design. Section 3 reports our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 We study two different treatments with concentrated harm. In our main treatment, which corresponds to
the scope of externalities in BWY, a buyer is randomly matched to a third party in every period of the
repeatedly-played market game so that it is not necessarily the same third party that would be harmed in
different periods of the game. In an additional treatment, there is a fixed match between a buyer and a
third party, so that the externality is directed to the same third party in every period. We find that the
market share of the fair product is not different in the two treatments (43 percent in the former vs. 45
percent in the latter treatment).
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2 Experimental design
Our design is based on the market paradigm introduced by BWY. This involves a
posted-offer product market, repeated for 24 periods, in which firms and consumers
can trade products with and without negative externalities. Our primary modifica-
tion is to vary the scope of the externality produced by the exchange of a single
product.
2.1 Market game
A market comprises 16 participants: four sellers, six buyers and six third parties.
Roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the study and remain fixed
throughout all 24 market periods. At the beginning of a period, each participant
receives an initial endowment of 100.3 At the end of the experiment, one period is
randomly selected to determine payments.
Buyers and sellers can exchange two types of products, which differ only in their
negative impact on third parties and in their production cost. One product (‘‘fair’’) is
socially responsible—i.e., does not produce negative externalities—but costs 20 to
produce. The other product (‘‘harmful’’) creates a negative externality of 60 for third
parties, but costs nothing to produce. Both types of products have identical value
(50) to the buyer, meaning that a preference for one over the other can only be
driven by concern for social impact.
At the beginning of each period, sellers simultaneously select product types (fair
or harmful) and prices (between 0 and 50) in a posted-offer market. Once all sellers
make their decisions, the resulting offers are publicly revealed to all market
participants. Buyers then simultaneously decide whether to buy at most one product.
Multiple buyers can buy from the same seller, meaning that an individual seller can
sell between 0 and 6 products.4 Each seller earns, for each product sold, the
difference between the posted price and the production cost. Each buyer earns, if he
decides to buy a product, the difference between the product’s value of 50 and the
price paid.
Third parties can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses depending on the
nature of products exchanged. Our focus is on two treatments that hold constant the
size of a product’s externality, but vary who it impacts. In treatment Concentrated,
the purchase of a product by a buyer in a period affects one randomly-selected third
party, as in BWY. More precisely, if the buyer purchases a harmful product, this
imposes a loss of 60 on the selected third party. In treatment Diffused, there is no
match between a buyer and a third party. Instead, if a buyer purchases a harmful
product, this imposes a loss of 10 on each of the six third parties associated with that
3 Payoffs in the experiment were denominated in points and converted to cash at the conclusion of a
session at a rate of 5 points = 1 CHF.
4 The main design change relative to BWY—other than the variation of the scope of externality—is the
removal of the sellers’ capacity constraints, which limited sellers to a single unit in the study by BWY.
This change substantially increases the competition among sellers, since a single seller can now serve the
entire market. We also made one additional minor change from the design in BWY, setting the production
costs for the fair and harmful products to, respectively, 0 and 20, in contrast with 0 and 10 in BWY.
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market. Importantly, the design holds constant the total loss imposed on passive
third parties by a harmful product purchase across the two treatments—0 for a fair
product and 60 for a harmful product. Therefore, these two treatments—
Concentrated and Diffused—allow us to test whether, starting from the design in
BWY, making the impact of an externality more diffused among an impacted
population significantly diminishes the degree of concern for social impact
exhibited by market participants.
In addition, we conducted a further experimental treatment to ensure that the
harm in the Concentrated treatment is actually perceived to be concentrated on a
single individual. Note that in the Concentrated treatment based on BWY and
described above, the buyer’s product choice impacts a different, randomly selected,
third party in every period. It is thus possible that a buyer perceives the choice of a
harmful product as causing a loss of 10 in expectation for each third party. As a
consequence, the harm imposed might not be perceived as concentrated but as
‘‘diffused in expectation.’’ To ensure that subjects perceive the negative impact
imposed by market activity as truly concentrated on a single individual, we
conducted a third treatment, Concentrated & Fixed, in which the impact of a
specific buyer’s purchasing decision harms the same third party in all 24 periods of
the experiment. This treatment allows us to observe whether a greater concentration
of harm on a single, more personifiable, individual influences the degree of concern
exhibited by market participants.
2.2 Procedures
We conducted 10 independent markets for each treatment. In total, 480 participants
took part in our study. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. We implemented the experiment using
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and recruitment using h-Root (Block et al. 2014).
Within each market, participants were randomized to roles by drawing a number
at the beginning of a session, and then received written instructions followed by
control questions. The experimental instructions are provided in the Appendix of
Electronic Supplementary Material. An audio file with a summary of the
instructions was played before the experiment, to establish common information
regarding the market rules. Each session lasted approximately 1.5 h. On average,
participants earned CHF 39 (about 38 USD), which included a show up fee of CHF
15.
3 Results
Our main focus is the comparison of the market outcomes in treatment
Concentrated, where the externality from trading the harmful product is imposed
on a single person with the market outcomes in treatment Diffused, where the
externality from trading the harmful product is diffused over several people. We
additionally compare treatment Concentrated, where the externality caused by a
buyer’s purchase of a harmful product is imposed on a different person each period,
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to a third treatment, Concentrated & Fixed, where the externality is imposed on the
same person each period.
Our analysis focuses on the 99 percent of cases in which buyers made a trade and
excludes the 1 percent of cases in which buyers did not make a purchase. Our focus
is on the market share of fair products in the different treatments, though we also
consider prices. Additionally, we examine the individual behavior of buyers, by
conducting structural estimation of parameters in a simple utility framework in
which buyers care about their own earnings and about the social cost imposed by
their market behavior.
3.1 Concentrated versus diffused
We first compare the market shares of the fair product between treatments
Concentrated and Diffused. This measures the percentage of the maximum possible
impact of negative externalities that is mitigated by market actors producing and
purchasing the ‘‘fair’’ product instead of the ‘‘harmful’’ product. Note that the
prediction of the traditional model, assuming narrow self-interest among all market
participants, is that the fair product will be absent.
Figure 1 shows market shares. Across all periods, these shares are 43 percent in
treatment Concentrated and 34 percent in treatment Diffused. While these market
shares are ordered in the manner one would expect when assuming less concern for
more diffused harm, the differences are statistically insignificant using a two-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, either at the market (p = 0.13) or buyer (p = 0.58) level.
Fig. 1 Market shares of fair products (Concentrated vs. Diffused)
On the scope of externalities in experimental markets
123
Moreover, the market share for fair products appears generally stable across rounds
in both the Concentrated and Diffused treatments. Similarly to BWY, market
participants regularly trade fair products at their own expense—between one-third
and one-half of the time—to avoid imposing externalities on society, both in
treatments Concentrated and Diffused. This indicates that market participants’
willingness to behave socially responsibly does not strongly depend on the scope of
the resulting externalities.
We also estimated random-effects probit models of the decision to buy a fair
product, which are reported in Table 1. Treatment Concentrated serves as the
omitted category in all regression models. Model 1 utilizes data from all 24 periods,
while we restrict the analysis to periods 13–24 in model 2. Focusing on the second
half of the study serves as a robustness check in which we limit the analysis to those
periods where behavior is likely to have stabilized following any initial learning and
adjustment. Indeed, Fig. 1 indicates that behavior is generally stable in both
treatments following some initial adjustment, and that the treatment difference is
generally consistent in periods 13–24. The table shows that the coefficient of the
indicator variable for treatment Diffused is negative and significant at the five
percent level in model 1 and at the one percent level in model 2. Models 3 and 4
consider again either all periods or only the second half of the experiment,
respectively, and additionally include Period as an explanatory variable and its
interaction with the treatment variable. In model 3, the coefficient for the interaction
term is negative and significant, indicating that the main source of treatment effects
is the slight differences in time trends apparent in Fig. 1. However, as model 4
reveals, these time trends are small and insignificant in the second half of the
experiment, and the resulting difference in levels of socially responsible behavior—
Table 1 Random-effects probit regression of the fair choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diffused - 0.324** (0.146) - 0.621*** (0.205) 0.109 (0.198) - 0.801* (0.426)
Period 0.019* (0.010) - 0.008 (0.019)
Diffused 9 period - 0.035** (0.015) 0.010 (0.020)
Constant - 0.155 (0.103) - 0.036 (0.127) - 0.387** (0.153) 0.119 (0.344)
Periods 1–24 13–24 1–24 13–24
Observations 2855 1432 2855 1432
Number of buyers 120 120 120 120
The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a fair product and 0 if the
buyer purchased a harmful product; we omit the 1 percent of cases in which the consumer purchased no
product. Treatment Concentrated serves as the omitted category in all regression models. ‘‘Diffused’’ is a
binary variable taking on value 1 for data generated in treatment Diffused. Models 1 and 3 report the
results for all 24 periods, such that ‘‘Period’’ takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Models 2 and 4
report the results for the last 12 periods only, such that ‘‘Period’’ takes on integer values between 13 and
24. The table reports raw probit coefficients. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
market level
***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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identified by the negative coefficient on the treatment variable—is marginally
significant, at the ten percent level.
Hence, while our non-parametric and regression analyses both point to lower
concern for the negative social impact of the externality when the impact of a
harmful product is diffused among several third parties, this effect is moderate in
magnitude and not robustly statistically significant. Moreover, behavior in both
treatments remains far from the predictions derived from traditional theory under
the assumption of narrow self-interest, which predicts a zero market share for the
harmful product.
We next study who bears the burden of the cost of producing the fair product.
Figure 2 presents the mean of the endogenously determined prices for both types of
products. The figure reveals that fair products persistently trade at higher prices than
harmful products in both treatments, reflecting the higher production cost associated
with fair products. The price premium—i.e., the difference between the mean price
of the fair product and mean price of the harmful one—is equal to 16.32 in
treatment Concentrated and 14.48 in treatment Diffused.5 This indicates that most of
the cost of eliminating the negative externality—a cost equal to 20—is borne by
Fig. 2 Prices of each type of product (Concentrated vs. Diffused)
5 We calculate the average price paid for each type of product in all periods where both types were
bought and report the difference of these prices averaged over all periods in all markets. We thus neglect
prices in cases where only one type of product was bought in a given period and market. Simply
calculating the respective average prices of all fair and of all unfair products bought in all periods and
markets and taking the difference yields very similar price premiums of 15.21 and 13.36, respectively, for
treatment Concentrated and treatment Diffused.
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buyers.6 Figure 2 further reveals that the prices of both types of products are very
similar in both treatments. There are no significant differences between the two
treatments for prices of the same product type when averaged at the market level
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.33 for the fair product and p = 0.88 for the harmful
product, two-sided).
3.2 Additional treatment with concentrated harm
Recall that, in treatment Concentrated, a buyer’s product purchases impact a
randomly determined third party, with a new third party selected in every period.
This could, in principle, be perceived by the subjects as a negative impact that is
diffused in expectation. Therefore, we conduct an additional treatment, Concen-
trated & Fixed, in which, for each buyer, a third party is selected at the beginning of
the experiment so that the buyer’s product purchases impact the same third party in
every period. Thus, in this treatment, concentrated harm is entirely focused upon
one other individual.7
Figure 3 shows that the market shares in treatments Concentrated & Fixed and
Concentrated are very similar, 45 percent versus 43 percent, respectively.
A Wilcoxon rank-sum test (two-sided) confirms that the difference is not
statistically significant, at either the market (p = 0.97) or buyer (p = 0.79) level.8
These results indicate that making a more permanent and salient match between a
market participant and the individual impacted by the market actor’s behavior does
not significantly affect the degree to which market outcomes reflect a concern for
negative externalities. Hence, moving further in the direction of more concentrated
harm does not appear to have a strong impact on the extent to which subjects
demonstrate concern for the external impacts of their market activity.
3.3 Individual behavior of buyers
We next consider more closely the individual behavior of buyers. Figure 4 shows
the empirical cumulative distributions (CDFs) of individual buyer behavior over the
course of the experiment for each of the three treatments. A buyer’s behavior refers
to that subject’s frequency of fair product purchases over the course of the 24
periods of the experiment; a buyer who never bought a fair product corresponds to a
frequency of 0, while a buyer who always did so corresponds to a frequency of 1.
Thus, for example, the dotted line shows that slightly over 10 percent of buyers
never bought a fair product in treatment Concentrated & Fixed. The CDFs reveal
6 Note that in 5 percent of cases, sellers offered the fair product at prices below its production cost,
perhaps out of a desire to partially subsidize such products. Buyers often accepted these offers, driving
down average market prices. This yields a case in Fig. 2 where the average price is below the production
cost of 20.
7 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this treatment.
8 The prices of fair and harmful product types do not differ much between the two treatments (shown in
Figure A1 in the appendix of Electronic Supplementary Material). These differences are not statistically
significant, when aggregated at the market level (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.45 for the fair product
and p = 0.26 for the harmful one, two-sided).
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Fig. 3 Market shares of fair products (Concentrated vs. Concentrated & Fixed)
Fig. 4 Cumulative distribution of individual buyer behavior
On the scope of externalities in experimental markets
123
substantial heterogeneity and dispersion in buyers’ behavior across all the
treatments. Moreover, only a minority of buyers consistently bought either the
unfair or the fair product—only about 5, 12 and 7 percent of buyers always bought
the unfair product in Diffused, Concentrated and Concentrated & Fixed, respec-
tively, and about 7, 8 and 17 percent always bought the unfair product, respectively.
While these numbers and the distributions in Fig. 1 differ slightly, two-sample
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests cannot reject the equality of distributions when
comparing either treatments Concentrated and Diffused (p = 0.304) or Concen-
trated and Concentrated & Fixed (p = 0.304), and there is only a marginally
statistically significant difference between the distributions when comparing
Diffused and Concentrated & Fixed (p = 0.085).
Finally, to further investigate buyer behavior, we estimate parameters for a utility
model that incorporates buyers’ concerns for their own earnings and for social
impact. More specifically, the basic model is:
utk ¼ hxtk þ cytk þ etk;
corresponding to a buyer’s utility from a potential choice of a product k in a period
t. In this utility framework, xtk equals a buyer’s own payoff from that product
(determined by a product’s price) and ytk equals the social cost of that product
(either 0 or 60). Following McFadden (1974), etk is an extreme-value (logit) error.
Models 1 to 3 in Table 2 show that, in all treatments, buyers care about their own
earnings—reflected in the positive coefficient for ‘‘Buyer Earnings.’’ They also care
about lowering social costs—reflected in the negative coefficient for ‘‘Social Cost.’’
Table 2 Utility model
Concentrated Diffused Concentrated &
fixed
All treatments All treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buyer earnings
(h)
0.170***
(0.023)
0.178***
(0.028)
0.210***
(0.031)
0.184***
(0.016)
0.183***
(0.016)
Social cost (c) - 0.038***
(0.008)
- 0.027***
(0.007)
- 0.052***
(0.013)
- 0.041***
(0.006)
- 0.042***
(0.006)
Social cost 9
Diffused
0.012 (0.009) 0.014* (0.008)
Social cost 9
Fixed
- 0.004
(0.007)
Observations 7200 7200 7200 21,600 21,600
Cases 1440 1440 1440 4320 4320
‘‘Fixed’’ and ‘‘Diffused’’ are binary variables, taking on value 1 for data generated in treatments Con-
centrated & Fixed and Diffused, respectively. Treatment Concentrated serves as the omitted category in
model 4. Treatments Concentrated and Concentrated & Fixed serve as the omitted categories in model 5,
since we do not include ‘‘Fixed’’ in this specification. Standard errors, clustered at the market level, in
parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
B. Bartling et al.
123
Beyond the sign of these two coefficients, we can also infer relative concern for own
payoffs and for social impact from the coefficients’ relative magnitudes. Specif-
ically, their ratio indicates the relative concern that the average buyer places on her
own earnings versus the social impact of her market behavior. For example, in
model 1, this ratio is - 4.47, suggesting that, on average, buyers in the
Concentrated treatment are willing to sacrifice one unit of payoff to reduce the
social cost by roughly 4.5 units. Consistent with Fig. 1, this measure of social
concern is slightly lower in treatment Diffused—i.e., the ratio is - 6.59. Moreover,
social concern is similar in treatments Concentrated (- 4.47) and Concentrated &
Fixed (- 4.04), which is consistent with Fig. 3. In model 4, we test whether the
difference in concern for social costs differs between the treatments when the effects
are estimated jointly. The interaction terms ‘‘Social Cost X Diffused’’ and ‘‘Social
Cost X Fixed’’ are statistically insignificant, indicating that neither change from
treatment Concentrated, which corresponds to the scope of externalities in BWY
and serves as omitted category in model 4, yields a substantial impact on buyers’
social concern.9 In model 5, we omit the interaction ‘‘Social Cost X Fixed’’ so that
‘‘Social Cost X Diffused’’ picks up the difference between treatment Diffused and
both treatments with concentrated harm—i.e., in this model, Concentrated and
Concentrated & Fixed represent the omitted category. We find that ‘‘Social Cost X
Diffused’’ is marginally statistically significant, at the ten percent level. Thus, when
we pool the two treatments with concentrated harm, buyers appear to exhibit a
higher concern for social impact when the harm is diffused. However, as in our
earlier analysis, this treatment effect is not robustly statistically significant.
4 Conclusions
When present, the external effects of market activity potentially constitute a major
source of societal inefficiency. Understanding the conditions under which socially
responsible behavior by market actors can yield a remedy, at least partially, is thus
of high interest. This paper focuses on one particular, potentially important, driver
of socially responsible market behavior: the scope of externalities.
We find that market participants’ concern for social responsibility—i.e., trading
more costly but less harmful products—is influenced slightly by the degree to which
negative externalities are borne by a single person or are diffused over several
people, holding constant the total impact. Diffused market impacts elicit somewhat
less concern, though the magnitude of this difference is of moderate magnitude and
its statistical significance is not robust. Importantly, even when the social harm is
diffused, the market share of the fair product stabilizes at a substantial level—34
percent. Thus, while we do find some evidence that market participants respond to
the scope of an externality, they appear to primarily weigh the total harm produced
by their actions, rather than disproportionately weighting the impact felt by any
single person.
9 If we, instead, use treatment Concentrated & Fixed as the omitted category in model (4), the coefficient
Social Cost X Diffused is positive and marginally statistically significant (p\ 0.1).
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An additional contribution of this paper is to address a potential explanation for
divergent experimental findings concerning pro-sociality in markets. Plott (1983), in
one of the first studies to investigate the voluntary internalization of externalities in
an experimental market, observed markets to behave as if there were no externalities
at all—suggesting that market outcomes are accurately predicted by the traditional
model, even in the presence of externalities. However, the results of more recent
experimental contributions often yield apparent significant concern for the negative
external impacts of market behavior (e.g., Danz et al. 2012; Falk and Szech 2013;
Bartling et al. 2015; Irlenbusch and Saxler 2015; Kirchler et al. 2015; Pigors and
Rockenbach 2016; Sutter et al. 2016). For instance, Bartling et al. (BWY) find
substantial market shares of a ‘‘fair’’ product that does not produce a negative
externality but is more expensive to produce than an otherwise identical ‘‘harmful’’
product that imposes a negative externality on a third party. That is, in BWY’s
experimental markets, buyers and sellers are willing to forgo money in order to
avoid imposing harm on other subjects—a kind of pro-social behavior that was
largely absent in Plott’s earlier market experiment. While the externality in Plott is
diffused and trade exerts a small per capita impact on many individuals, in BWY the
negative social impact is concentrated on a single individual. Our data suggests that
this difference does not account for why BWY find prevalent concern for social
impact among market actors, while Plott finds little evidence of such concern.
Of course, there remain many open questions regarding the conditions under
which market participants will voluntarily internalize the external impacts of their
market activity. For instance the current paper does not provide an answer to the
question of why market participants in Plott’s earlier design entirely disregard the
externality, while market participants in BWY’s design do not. Several possibilities
remain. One such possibility is the market design: Plott used a double-auction
market mechanism but BWY and our present study employ a posted-offer market.10
Another possibility deals with who is impacted by the externalities produced by
market activity—market actors, as in Plott’s study, or passive third parties, as in
BWY. Exploring each of these possible factors is beyond the scope of the current
paper. We thus leave it to future research to further examine the determinants of
socially responsible market behavior and thereby shed further light on the important
issue of when markets actors respond to the presence of negative externalities, and
when they do not.
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10 We can, however, argue that it is unlikely that increased competition in double-auction markets alone
is responsible for the difference. BWY study a treatment in which there is increased competition between
firms, relative to the baseline design, and find that socially responsible behavior is not less prevalent in
this treatment. Moreover, the design we employ in this paper also increases competition among sellers,
relative to BWY (see footnote 4), and we find virtually no difference in the market shares of fair products
despite the higher production cost in the current study.
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